ABSTRACT UK plc's use option schemes and increasingly long-term incentive plans (LTIP's) to reward their executive directors in order to improve corporate performance and align their interests more closely with those of the shareholders of the company. This paper presents a "pilot study" of the option and LTIP arrangements used by a sample of 84 large UK companies over the period 1994-98. The general finding is that a large proportion of the schemes are "undemanding", rewarding average rather than exceptional performance.
INTRODUCTION
The UK Government has recently become more and more concerned at the size of pay increases awarded to the executives of large UK companies and, in particular, the substantial payouts they have been receiving from option and LTIP schemes, seemingly not justified by equivalent improvements in company performance. In response the Government is now considering amendments to the Companies' Act to make executive directors more 'accountable' to their shareholders on pay issues, including a requirement that the Remuneration Committee Report be voted on by shareholders separately from the main Report and Accounts at the Annual General Meeting. Companies' counter claim to this charge is that basic salaries must reflect international pay levels in order to attract and retain top class executive directors and that the widespread use of long-term incentive schemes provides ample evidence of their desire to link executive pay rewards to corporate performance.
This article presents an empirical study of the option/LTIP performance criteria used by a sample of large UK companies to illustrate current practice and provides details of the importance of performance-related remuneration of executives relative to non-performance-related pay (specifically, basic salary and benefits such as company car expenses).
GENERAL FEATURES OF OPTION/LTIP SCHEMES
A substantial number of companies now operate 'long-term incentive schemes' in addition to the traditional 'annual bonus' as a means of motivating the executive directors of the company to improve corporate financial performance and thus align their interests more closely with those of the company's shareholders. Options have been the main instrument of long-term financial rewards but in many companies they have been augmented (or in some cases supplanted) by
long-term incentive plans (LTIPs).
An executive option scheme involves the grant/award of a specified number of shares in a company to its executives. Options are granted at the discretion of the company's Remuneration Committee and they are usually phased-in over a number of years. Options are mostly granted on a salary-related basis. Under Inland Revenue provisions share option grants under 'approved' schemes (ie. those qualifying for tax concessions) can be awarded up to a maximum value of £30,000. Additional, ('non-qualifying') options may be awarded up to a maximum of four times current salary (less the outstanding value of 'approved' options). Options are granted at a specified 'exercise' price which is normally the market price of the company's share at the date of grant. The exercise/vesting of options typically can only occur between three and ten years after the date of grant. Most options can be exercised provided that certain pre-determined financial performance 'targets' are achieved over a specified time period, usually 3 years.
Typically, option schemes require the company's earnings per share (EPS) to grow at a rate greater than the increase in the Retail Price Index (RPI) over the same period or growth in 'total shareholder return' (TSR) to exceed that of companies comprising, for example, the FTSE-100 Index.
For example, Astra Zeneca's option scheme requires its EPS growth to exceed that of the increase in the RPI by at least 9% over three years, whilst Kingfisher's scheme requires its EPS growth to outstrip that of the increase in the RPI by at least 6% over three years; Allied Domecq's option scheme requires its TSR growth to be greater than the average TSR growth of companies comprising the FTSE-100 Index over three years whilst Northern Foods scheme requires its TSR to be greater than the average TSR growth of a peer group of companies over three years. Executives secure a financial gain on the options awarded to them if at the time of vesting the market price of the company's shares is greater than the designated 'exercise price'. Executive LTIP's are similar to options insofar as they involve the periodic grant and vesting of shares in the company, again the vesting of shares being conditional on the attainment of specified performance `targets' again usually over a 3 year period. However, there are some notable differences. Firstly, whereas options are granted at an 'exercise price' (for example, £1.50, £3.25), LTIP shares are usually granted at zero price (i.e. they are given 'free'). Secondly, 'benchmarking' is related specifically to the performance of other companies rather than the RPI, including companies comprising the FTSE -100 Index, or more narrowly, a peer group of companies operating in the same industrial sector. Thirdly, whereas options are exercised on an 'all or nothing' basis, LTIP's are typically 'scaled', involving a minimum (partial vesting) point, rising up to a maximum (full vesting) point. For example, PowerGen's LTIP targets TSR growth relative to the TSR growth of companies comprising the FTSE-100 Index over three years. Options Table 1 provides summary data of the performance criteria for options. Of the 84 companies, one firm (Great Universal Stores) had no option scheme. One firm's option scheme was "not performance related" and a further 15 companies whilst operating option schemes provided no details as to their exact performance requirements. Thus, Table 1 is based on 67 "usable" observations. As indicated earlier, Table 1 shows that companies in the main target earnings per share and to a lesser extent total shareholder return, with 47 companies (70% of the sample) using EPS targets and 13 companies (19% of the sample) targeting TSR. Table 2 indicates that the main 'comparator' used by companies was the Retail Price Index with 43 companies (64%) benchmarking their own performance against the RPI, whilst a further 19 companies (28%) benchmarked their own performance against various FTSE indices. Table 3 shows the performance requirements aimed at in order to trigger option payments. It will be noted that in a substantial number of cases target figures relating to the RPI appear to be relatively undemanding. Two-thirds of companies using the RPI set a goal of beating inflation by 3% or under. All nineteen companies using FTSE indices required a performance which was 'above average' (mainly unspecified), but only four companies indicated a target achievement which placed them in the top quartile. Table 4 gives details of the performance criteria used by companies. The TSR target predominates, with 29 of the 53 companies operating LTIPs using the TSR criteria (55% of the sample), followed by 17 companies (32%) targeting EPS Table 5 summarises the comparators used by companies to benchmark their own performance. In contrast to option comparators, LTIP comparators focus mainly on intercompany measures rather than the ubiquitous RPI benchmark. 24 companies (45%) used a broad based FTSE indice and a further 14 companies (26%) used a self-selected (narrow) peer group measure. Table 6 indicates the performance requirement aimed at in order to trigger minimum LTIP payouts. In general LTIP target figures are more demanding than the average option target figure but still not exceptional. Eighteen of the 38 companies using indices as a comparator required the company to be placed only in the second lowest quartile to activate partial payments. This said, however, unlike options which are paid on an 'all or nothing' basis the fact that LTIP awards are 'scaled' generally means that in order to achieve full payments the company must be placed in the top quartile.
OPTION AND LTIP PAYOUTS
As indicated earlier the purpose of option and LTIP schemes is to motivate executives to improve corporate performance, particularly as it relates to shareholder interests. To this end most such schemes have incorporated performance targets to be attained in order to activate rewards to executive. Over the period of the survey (1994-98) nearly all of the 84 companies have attained (wholly or in part) their self-selected performance targets and thus made payments under their option/LTIP arrangements. It will be instructive, therefore, to examine the relative magnitude of performance-related long-term option/LTIP payments compared to (non-performance-related) basic salaries and benefits, together with those
No. of companies 29 17 7 Table 7 calculates option/LTIP and annual bonus payments as a percentage of basic salary and benefits for the period 1994-98. Thirty-seven companies (44% of the sample) paid annual bonuses equivalent to one-quarter to one-half of basic salary/benefits and in the case of a further seven companies annual bonuses amounted to over one-half to threequarters of basic pay. By contrast, option/LTIP payments in the range of 25-49% of basic salaries/benefits was much smaller compared to annual bonuses (only 16% of the sample), but significantly in the case of seven companies option/LTIP payments were equivalent to between three-quarters and one hundred % of basic pay and for eleven companies long-term performance related payments were greater than basic pay over the five year period.
Clearly, the Government's implication noted in the introduction that there appears to be little linkage between executive remuneration and corporate performance cannot be substantiated. Eightythree of the sample of 84 companies operate option schemes and 54 of these also use LTIP arrangements as a means of rewarding executives who succeed in attaining specified performance targets. The link is there although subject to the caveat that self-selected performance requirements may well be too 'easy' or 'undemanding', rewarding average rather than exceptional performance.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT DEBATE: HAVE DIRECTORS TOO MUCH POWER?
Academic, practitioners' and now the Governments' interest in the remuneration of executive directors is part of the wider debate concerning the 'principal-agent' issue, specifically who really is in charge of top level corporate affairs -directors or shareholders? The alleged shift from 'owner (shareholder) control' to executive directors-control' in large and medium sized companies has led to a situation in which although a company's shareholders are its ultimate 'owners' de facto 'control' resides in the hands of the company's board of directors. Shareholders on the whole are too fragmented and too remote from the company's strategic decision-making processes, thus leaving policies to be determined by the executive directors of the company. At the heart of the 'divorce of ownership from control' debate has been the interference that directors (as agents appointed to act on behalf of the shareholders) may have objectives which differ from those of their shareholders (as principals). Specifically, it has been argued that executives although servants of the shareholders are likely to be more concerned with their own rewards than explicitly working towards maximising shareholder returns. The presumption is that company size (as measured by assets and turnover) rather than profitability is an important determinant of executive's remuneration since large companies, with complex and lengthy hierarchical structures, usually pay higher salaries than smaller sized companies. However, the divorce of ownership from control proposition may not be as ubiquitous as some commentators suggest for two main reasons. One, the continuing growth in the ownership of equities by institutional investors (insurance companies, pension funds, investment and unit trusts, in particular) has led to a significant increase in the concentration of shareholdings in Some commentators have suggested the need for a much more proactive approach to provide 'checks' on executive pay. A start was made in this direction with the publication of the Greenbury Report on executive remuneration in July 1995 and the incorporation of its 'best practices' recommendations into the listing rules of the London Stock Exchange. Annual Reports and Accounts, specifically the Report of the Remuneration Committee now set out a company's remuneration objectives and policies and provide details of the remuneration packages of each of the directors holding office during the reporting year. This has greatly improved the 'visibility' of how executive remuneration is made up and it is now easier to distinguish between performance and non-performance related pay awards.
The Government is currently examining a number of 'proposals' to improve the 'accountability' of directors and shareholders for their remuneration policies. These include:
1. Requiring companies to allow shareholders to vote at the annual general meeting on the Remuneration Committee's report, separately from that of the main Annual Report and Accounts.
2. Requiring companies to have an explicit remuneration policy and to seek shareholder agreement to it each year.
3. Requiring directors of companies to stand for re-selection each year.
4. Requiring companies to ask shareholders to reelect the chairman of the Remuneration Committee every year. 
